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Whittling Down the Collective Interest
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On Friday 31 July, the Cypriot parliament voted against the Comprehensive Economic
and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada. This latest development in the ratification
process of CETA illustrates perfectly how facultative mixity continuously frustrates our
collective interest in seeing the development of a European public sphere by forcing the
discussion on European issues in isolated national public spheres.
An ultra vires decision
It has been reported that the Cypriot parliament rejected the agreement over the issue
of the protection of Halloumi cheese. If this is indeed the case, the Cypriot
representatives acted ultra vires. Appellations of origin come under the exclusive
competence of the EU in the framework of the Common Commercial Policy (see also C-
389/15). As a result, and because national parliaments have no say over the EU’s
exclusive competence other than indirectly through their governments represented in
the EU Council, the Cypriot parliament cannot invoke it in the national ratification
procedure as a reason for rejecting a trade agreement. If it wants to push the Halloumi
issue, it needs to give instructions to the Cypriot representative in the EU Council.
The Cypriot vote does not necessarily spell the end of the provisional application of
CETA however, since the latter will only be terminated if ratification of CETA “fails
permanently and definitively”. Yet it is clear that the choice to conclude CETA as a
mixed agreement is starting to bite back. The Halloumi-incident is a classic illustration
of how mixity makes the EU’s external action more burdensome and complicated and
this, we argue, unnecessarily so. The choice for mixed action in cases of facultative
mixity – as in the case of CETA – undermines democracy and the collective interests of
EU Member States and citizens. It is high time that the choice for mixity in a context of
shared competence be made subject to an external check.
Mixity: always good for democracy?
Mixity renders the ratification of CETA more cumbersome and uncertain. This is
considered by many a price worth paying. The argument is frequently made – and
permeates for instance the Namur Declaration – that the involvement of 30 or so
parliaments leads to greater democratic legitimacy. The argument has intuitive appeal:
national parliaments are close to EU citizens, and a greater number of parliaments will
surely lead to more rigorous scrutiny.
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While we are sceptical whether involving more parliaments always benefits democracy
– is it democratically sound that an assembly representing less than 800 000 EU
citizens can block the ratification of an agreement affecting over 450 million people? –
we wish to draw attention to an often overlooked but crucial element in the discussion
on the democratic legitimacy of mixity in the case of CETA: mixity was the result of a
political choice by the Council. And one with a high price at that, as the choice for mixity
significantly hollows out the powers of the European Parliament and frustrates a
European debate about an issue that is essentially European.
Challenging facultative mixity to protect European democracy
As it befits a multi-level polity with conferred powers only, the question of the
democratic legitimation of EU action needs to follow the competence question.
Internally, depending on which level of governance is competent to act, the process of
democratic legitimation passes through the institutions at either the EU or the Member
State level. If an issue falls under exclusive or shared EU competence, the European
Parliament and the Council provide the necessary democratic legitimacy through the
procedures set out in the Treaties. If an issue falls under exclusive Member State
competence, or if a Member State acts when the EU has not (yet) acted, that Member
State acts in accordance with its own constitutional procedures. This way, direct lines of
accountability run from the entity that acts towards the citizenry that holds that entity
to account and the EU citizen.
Things are different in the external context where, as in the case of CETA, the EU and
the Member States often act jointly. This has negative repercussions for the EU
institutions, and in particular for the European Parliament, which sees its position
reduced to but one out of over 30 assemblies with the power to approve or reject CETA.
As a consequence, the Parliament is deprived of part of its power: it can reject the
agreement, but it cannot approve it. It can vote against CETA (as did the Cypriot
parliament), and that would be the end of it. If the European Parliament votes in favour
of CETA (as it has done in 2017), the focus of political debate shifts to the national
parliaments, where the debate now continues.
The foregoing would have been necessary had it been established that the EU lacked the
necessary competence to conclude CETA alone. This is not the case however and this is
why it can be claimed that the Parliament is deprived of a power. CETA is, in our view, a
case of facultative mixity. As the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) made clear in its
opinion on the EU-Singapore agreement, virtually that entire agreement, and therefore
also CETA, is covered by EU exclusive competences. Even for the agreement’s
provisions on Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement (ISDS), the Court has not explicitly
noted that these come under exclusive national competences (which would require a
mixed agreement, see Rosas).
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In addition to the competence question, the policy question whether the EU and its
Member States should bind themselves to rules foreseen in CETA is undoubtedly a
European question. It is not the sum of one European question and 27 national
questions. The national debates on CETA illustrate this since the reasons why CETA is
controversial are fundamentally the same in every Member State: the benefits of free
trade in general, ISDS, (the enforceability of) environmental and labour standards, the
alleged chilling effect on regulation, etc. Addressing these policy questions (also) at the
national level (in the name of democracy) has the perverse effect of obstructing a
genuinely European debate. In Habermasian terms: CETA would be an ideal topic to
discuss in the European public sphere and would incentivize the development of that
public sphere, which in turn would foster a European democracy. By opting to conclude
CETA as a mixed agreement, European public interests remain confined to and remain
to be expressed in national public spheres.
Time for an external check
There is something inherently perverse about an arrangement whereby the EU
institution representing Member State interests can unilaterally – and without being
subject to an external check — decide whether to empower those same Member States,
or the supranational EU institutions. As John Costonis, an American commentator,
observed over half a century in an article on the then EEC’s treaty making powers (p.
452): this is a bit like having the wolves guard the sheep.
Principles of sound institutional design would seem to require that the choice to go for
an EU-only or a mixed agreement in a context of shared competence be at the very least
subject to ex post review. For as long as the Council retains the final word on the
matter, mixity will be here to stay, even for agreements such as CETA that are covered
for 99% by exclusive EU competences.
In our view, the present arrangement can hardly be considered democratic due to its
negative impact on the European Parliament’s institutional position. Further,
facultative mixity undermines the EU’s ability to act in pursuit of the collective interest.
As Pescatore observed in 1999 (p. 388 at fn 6), ‘mixity combined with a presumption for
the competence of member states is … a way of whittling down systematically the
personality and capacity of the Community as a representative of the collective interest’.
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While you are here…
If you enjoyed reading this post – would you consider supporting our work? Just click
here. Thanks!
All the best, Max Steinbeis
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